



UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Analysis of United States Capitol Police Internal Post Assignments

Report Number OIG-2016-08

June 2016

~~Report Restriction Language~~

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**UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE
WASHINGTON, DC 20003**



OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

PREFACE

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) prepared this report pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. It is one of a series of audits, reviews, and investigative and special reports OIG prepares periodically as part of its oversight responsibility with respect to the United States Capitol Police (USCP or Department) to identify and prevent fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement.

This report is the result of an analysis of internal posts manned by USCP officers to determine the necessity of each post and whether the Department could staff it with civilian or sworn personnel, as well as identify any potential personnel or cost savings.

I express my appreciation to those contributing to the preparation of this report.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Fay F. Ropella".

Fay F. Ropella
Inspector General

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Capitol Police Board	Board
Capitol Visitor Center	CVC
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Library of Congress	LOC
Mission Assurance Bureau	MAB
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Office of Inspector General	OIG
Operational Services Bureau	OSB
Patrol/Mobile Response Division	PMRD
Private First Class	PFC
Science Applications International Corporation	SAIC
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Uniformed Services Bureau	USB
United States Capitol Police	USCP or Department
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
United States Senate Child Care Center	USSCCC

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

At the request of the United States Capitol Police Board (the Board), the Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted an analysis of United States Capitol Police (USCP or the Department) internal post assignments.¹ Our objectives were to (1) detail full-time or recurring part-time internal posts manned by USCP officers, (2) determine the necessity of each post and whether the Department could staff it with civilian or sworn personnel, and (3) identify any potential personnel or cost savings if the Department could eliminate a post or staff it with civilian personnel. Our scope included full-time and recurring part-time internal posts manned by USCP officers as of April 11, 2016.

From a Department-provided list of posts USCP officers man as of April 2016, OIG identified [REDACTED] internal posts. The posts were fixed and indoors. The posts did not screen individuals entering buildings from outside through public or staff access points.

The Department demonstrated an operational purpose for the [REDACTED] internal posts. Of the [REDACTED] internal posts [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

According to previous security assessments of the Capitol Complex the Board commissioned in 1995 and 1998, USCP posted civilian security aides alongside sworn officers. The 1998 assessment recommended phasing out security aides through attrition and replacing them with law enforcement officers. In 2003, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)⁴ contracted with the Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) to review and evaluate USCP staffing level requirements. In its analysis, SAIC stated the Department should consider replacing its remaining civilian security aides with sworn personnel. Based on those previous reports, as of May 2016, the Department had phased out the majority of its security aide posts. OIG concluded, however, that the Department could civilianize 60 positions (27 privates first class [PFCs] assigned to posts in the Communications Section and 33 PFCs assigned to posts in

¹The Board requested OIG examine internal posts inside the U.S. Capitol, the House and Senate Office Buildings, and the Library of Congress but specified not to examine USCP door posts from the exterior or specialized units such as the Containment and Emergency Response Team or Dignitary Protection Division.

[REDACTED]

⁴ Effective July 7, 2004, GAO's legal name was changed from the General Accounting Office to the Government Accountability Office

the Command Center) within the USCP Mission Assurance Bureau (MAB) Operations Division. The Chief of Police and MAB officials agreed that the Department could civilianize most if not all of the internal postings. If the Department replaced the 60 sworn officers with civilian personnel, OIG estimated the Department would save approximately \$2.2 million in salaries and benefits.

[REDACTED]

In a June 14, 2016, Department response to the draft report, the Chief of Police agreed USCP could civilianize the posts within the Command Center and Communications Section and stated the Department had included funding for this purpose in its fiscal year 2017 budget request. Additionally, the Department had made a request through the Board, with the assistance of the Congressional leadership, to reduce the staffing requirement [REDACTED]. Based on the proactive steps the Department had taken related to internal post assignments, OIG did not make any recommendations at this time. Based on the Department's June 14, 2016, response to the draft report, OIG incorporated information where appropriate and attached the response in its entirety in Appendix A.

BACKGROUND

According to the Chief of Police, many of the United States Capitol Police (USCP or the Department) internal posts are the result of previous security assessments. The Department forms its posts in response to threats, securing restricted areas, protecting leadership, and/or aiding in evacuation procedures. USCP had several different types of posts and provided explanations for the following post types:


- Perimeter Access Control – [REDACTED]
- Perimeter Screening – [REDACTED]
- Interior Access Control – [REDACTED]
- Interior Screening – [REDACTED]

- Operational Support – [REDACTED]
- Patrol – [REDACTED]
- Chamber Security – [REDACTED]
- Chamber Screening – [REDACTED]

Many of the Department’s internal posts are the result of differences between the lists of items prohibited in the House, Senate, and Library of Congress (LOC) Buildings, the Capitol Building, and the House and Senate Galleries. For example, a visitor may bring aerosol containers, large bags, food, beverages, pepper spray, non-aerosol spray, letter openers, scissors, and razors, box cutters, or knives with a blade that is 3” or shorter into the House, Senate, and LOC Buildings but not into the Capitol Building. Furthermore, a visitor may bring creams, lotions, perfumes, strollers, cameras, recording devices, and battery-operated electronic devices into the Capitol Building but not into the House or Senate Galleries. As a result, the Department must conduct screenings for prohibited items at interior access points from the House, Senate, and LOC buildings into the Capitol Building as well as at entrances to the Galleries.

The Capitol Police Board (Board) previously commissioned two security assessments. In 1995, USCP and the [REDACTED] conducted a security assessment of the overall security posture of Capitol Hill. In 1998, an interagency task force consisting of representatives from USCP; the House Sergeant at Arms; the Architect of the Capitol; the [REDACTED] and the Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) assessed and updated the 1995 study and provided new recommendations to the Board. At the time of the studies, USCP posted civilian security aides alongside sworn officers. The 1998 task force recommended phasing out security aides through attrition and replacing them with law enforcement officers.

In 2003, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) contracted with SAIC to review and evaluate the methodology and rationale USCP used in developing its staffing level requirements and to explore other approaches or technology the Department could use for securing the Capitol Complex. In its *United States Capitol Police Staffing Analysis*, SAIC states the Department should consider replacing its remaining civilian security aides with sworn personnel. SAIC stated that replacing security aides with sworn officers would enhance the security of the Capitol Building by positioning sworn officers to react in the event of a breach in security as well as provide flexibility for reassigning and/or training sworn personnel during periods when Congress was not in session. In its analysis and references to USCP posting uniformed officers at the doors to [REDACTED]





OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY


At the request of the Board, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted an analysis of USCP internal post assignments.⁶ Our objectives were to (1) detail full-time or recurring part-time posts manned by USCP officers, (2) determine the necessity of each post and whether the Department could staff the post with civilian or sworn personnel, and (3) identify any potential personnel or cost savings if the Department could eliminate a post or staff it with civilian personnel. Our scope included full-time and recurring part-time internal posts manned by USCP officers as of April 11, 2016.

To accomplish our objectives, we interviewed pertinent Department officials to gain an understanding of the following areas:

- The number of internal post assignments manned by USCP officers
- The responsibilities for each USCP internal post assignment
- Department policies and procedures related to internal post assignments

From a Department-provided list of posts USCP officers man as of April 2016, OIG identified  internal posts. We identified all “Interior Access Control, Interior Screening, Operational Support, Life Safety Monitoring, Chamber Security and Chamber Screening” posts as internal posts. We also identified one “Perimeter Access Control” post as an internal post. The posts were fixed and indoors. The posts did not screen individuals entering buildings from outside through public or staff access points. We observed the  internal post assignments to determine the necessity of each post and whether the Department could staff it with civilian or sworn personnel.

We reviewed available Standard Operating Procedures, directives, and other internal USCP documents related to internal posts. We also reviewed staffing and organizational information. Furthermore, we reviewed the 1998 Capitol Security Task Force report, *United States Capitol*



⁶ The Board requested OIG examine internal posts inside the Capitol Building, the House and Senate Office Buildings, and the LOC but specified not to examine USCP doorposts from the exterior or specialized units such as the Containment and Emergency Response Team or Dignitary Protection Division.

Security Review, October 2008, and the SAIC report, *United States Capitol Police Staffing Analysis*.⁷ We followed up on any recommendations from those reports pertinent to internal posts.⁸ Additionally, we reviewed guidance from the [REDACTED]

We conducted fieldwork in Washington, D.C., from April 2016 through June 2016. We conducted our analysis in accordance with the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. We did not conduct an audit, the objective of which would be the expression of an opinion on Department programs. Accordingly, we do not express such an opinion. Had we performed additional procedures, other matters might have come to our attention that we would have reported. ~~This report is intended solely for the information and use of USCP, the Board, and OIG and should not be used by anyone other than the specified party.~~

RESULTS

From a Department-provided list of posts USCP officers man as of April 2016, we identified and detailed [REDACTED] internal post assignments. The Department demonstrated an operational purpose for the [REDACTED] internal posts.

[REDACTED] OIG estimated that civilianizing sworn posts within its Communications Section and Command Center would result in approximately \$2.2 million in annual salary and benefits savings for the Department.

Internal Posts

The [REDACTED] internal posts manned by USCP officers were located within the Capitol Building, Capitol Visitor Center (CVC), Senate, House, and LOC Buildings, Operational Services Bureau (OSB) Patrol/Mobile Response Division (PMRD), and the Mission Assurance Bureau (MAB) Operations Division.


Capitol Building


The Uniformed Services Bureau (USB) Capitol Division is responsible for the internal posts within the Capitol Building. As shown in [REDACTED], the Capitol Building had [REDACTED] internal posts. The Department identified [REDACTED] posts as “Chamber Security,” [REDACTED] as “Interior Access Control,” and [REDACTED] as “Chamber Screening.” We observed the [REDACTED] internal posts within the Capitol Building. The Department showed an operational purpose for the [REDACTED] internal posts by demonstrating post responsibilities and duties. The responsibilities of the posts varied but included responsibilities such as controlling access into restricted areas, monitoring the Senate and House Galleries, and


⁷ SAIC did not provide a date of issue in its report *United States Capitol Police Staffing Analysis*, but the final page of the report lists a creation date of March 8, 2005.

⁸ Only the recommendation from *United States Capitol Security Review*, dated October 2008, for the Department to phase out security aides through attrition and replace them with law enforcement officers applied to the scope of our analysis.

conducting screening for items prohibited in the Galleries. The number of posts within the Capitol Building fluctuates based on whether Congress is in session.








Capitol Visitor Center

Construction on CVC began in 2002. Personnel began to occupy the building in July 2008, and it opened to the public on December 2, 2008. The USB Capitol Division is responsible for the internal posts within CVC. As shown in [REDACTED], CVC had [REDACTED] internal posts. The Department identified [REDACTED] posts as “Interior Access Control” and [REDACTED] as “Life Safety Monitoring.” We observed the [REDACTED] internal posts within CVC. The Department showed an operational purpose for the [REDACTED] internal posts by demonstrating post responsibilities and duties. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] As previously stated, guidance does not require [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] According to a June 14, 2016, memorandum from the Chief of
Police, the Department had made a request through the Board, with the assistance of the
Congressional leadership, to [REDACTED]




Senate Division

The USB Senate Division is responsible for police services for the Senate Office Buildings, which includes the Dirksen, Hart, and Russell Buildings as well as the United States Senate Child Care Center (USSCCC), Webster Hall, and USCP Headquarters. As shown in [REDACTED], the Senate Division had [REDACTED] internal posts. The Department identified [REDACTED] posts as “Interior Access Control” and [REDACTED] as “Interior Screening.” We observed the [REDACTED] internal posts within the Senate Division. The Department showed an operational purpose for the [REDACTED] internal posts by demonstrating post responsibilities and duties. The responsibilities of the posts included verifying identification and screening for prohibited items for access to the Capitol as well as monitoring access to the USSCCC, Webster Hall, and [REDACTED]. As previously stated, guidance does not require [REDACTED]



[REDACTED]


[REDACTED]



Library Division

In October 2009, the LOC Buildings became part of the U.S. Capitol Building and grounds. The USB Library Division is responsible for all police services for the LOC, which includes the Adams, Jefferson, and Madison Buildings. As shown in [REDACTED] the Library Division had [REDACTED] internal posts. The Department identified all [REDACTED] of them as “Interior Screening” posts. We observed the [REDACTED] internal posts within the Library Division. The Department showed an

operational purpose for the [REDACTED] internal posts by demonstrating post responsibilities and duties. The responsibilities of the posts varied but included screening for prohibited items for access to the Capitol, verifying identification for access to the Madison Building and Cannon House Office Building, and exit screening for collection control. Exit screening for collection control includes ensuring individuals pass through a Knogo Portal⁹ and checking bags prior to exiting an LOC Building to ensure no LOC property improperly leaves the building. In its 2009 Memorandum of Understanding with LOC, the Department agreed to perform exit inspections using protocols that LOC established.




Operational Services Bureau Patrol/Mobile Response Division

OSB PMRD is responsible for motorized, bicycle, and foot patrols, canine operations, prisoner processing and transportation, drug and alcohol enforcement, crime scene search as well as the Containment and Emergency Response Team. As shown in [REDACTED] PMRD had [REDACTED]

The Department showed an operational purpose for this post by demonstrating post responsibilities and duties.

⁹ A Knogo Portal is an entryway that persons must walk through for the electronic detection of LOC materials.



Mission Assurance Bureau Operations Division

The MAB Operations Division includes the Department's Command Center and Communications Section. The Command Center is located within USCP Headquarters. The Communications Section posts are located within the [REDACTED]. As shown in [REDACTED] the Department's Operations Division had [REDACTED] posts staffed by sworn officers. We observed and identified all [REDACTED] as "Operational Support" posts. The Department showed an operational purpose for the [REDACTED] internal posts by demonstrating post responsibilities and duties. The responsibilities of the posts included receiving calls, operating the Department's radio system, monitoring alarms, monitoring cameras and providing notifications to the Department and stakeholders.


An MAB official stated that the Department could civilianize all of the posts within the Operations Division with the possible exception of the "E-Agent/NCIC Coordinator" and the [REDACTED]. According to the official, the "E-Agent/NCIC Coordinator" acts as a liaison to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and certifies the Department's use of the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) and the [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] The Department has already replaced sworn officers with civilian personnel in certain positions within the Operations Division and staffs its Library Communications Center with civilian personnel. The official stated the Department had 27 privates first class (PFCs) assigned to the Communications Section and 33 PFCs assigned to the Command Center. We agree that the Department could civilianize all of the posts within the Operations Division with the possible exception of the "E-Agent/NCIC Coordinator" and the [REDACTED].


[REDACTED] If the Department replaced the 27 PFCs within its Communications Section and 33 PFCs within its Command Center with civilian personnel, OIG estimates it would result in approximately \$2.2 million¹⁰ annual salary and benefits cost savings.

¹⁰ Based on information provided by the Department, as of April 2016, the average annual salary for a PFC was \$84,903. We applied a benefit rate of 38 percent, which the Department used in a November 6, 2015, Memorandum to the Board from a former Chief of Police, and calculated an average salary and benefits for a PFC of \$117,166. We then multiplied \$117,166 by 60, which was the number of PFCs within the Communications Section and Command Center as of June 2016, to estimate \$7,029,968 of total annual salary and benefits for PFCs. According to an MAB official, civilians within the Communications Section are either security control operators, which could be level 3 or 4 on the *Schedule of Rates of Basic Pay for Civilian Employees of the U.S. Capitol Police*, effective January 10, 2016, or dispatchers, which are level 5 on the schedule. Level 4 on the schedule starts at \$44,695, we

In a June 14, 2016, memorandum to OIG, the Chief of Police agreed the Department could civilianize the posts within the Command Center and Communications Section and stated the Department had included funding for this purpose in its fiscal year 2017 budget request.



applied the 38 percent benefit rate to calculate \$61,679 of annual salary and benefits for a civilian security control operator. Of the █ posts within the Communications Section, █ did not list dispatch responsibilities so we multiplied 27, which was the number of PFCs within the Communications Section as of June 2016, by 5/9 to arrive at 15, we then multiplied by \$61,679 to estimate \$925,187 of total annual salary and benefits for civilian security control operators. Level 5 on the schedule starts at \$51,279, we applied the 38 percent benefit rate to calculate \$70,765 of annual salary and benefits for a civilian dispatcher. Of █ posts within the Communications Section, 4 listed dispatch responsibilities so we multiplied 27, which was the number of PFCs within the Communications Section as of June 2016, by 4/9 to arrive at 12, which we then multiplied by \$70,765 to estimate \$849,180 of total annual salary and benefits costs for civilian dispatchers. According to the MAB official, civilian Command Center personnel should be levels 6, 7 or 8 on USCP's civilian schedule. Level 7 on the schedule starts at \$67,056, we applied the 38 percent benefit rate to calculate \$92,537 of annual salary and benefits for a civilian Command Center personnel. We then multiplied \$92,537 by 33, which was the number of PFCs within the Command Center as of June 2016, to estimate \$3,053,730 of total annual salary and benefits costs for civilian Command Center personnel. We then subtracted \$925,187, \$849,180 and \$3,053,730 from \$7,029,968 to calculate initial estimated annual cost and benefits savings of \$2,201,871.



APPENDICES

DEPARTMENT COMMENTS



UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
119 D STREET, NE
WASHINGTON, DC 20516-7218

June 14, 2016

COP 160681

MEMORANDUM

TO: Ms. Fay F. Ropella, CPA, CFE
Inspector General

FROM: Matthew R. Verderosa
Chief of Police

SUBJECT: OIG Report OIG-2016-08 Analysis of United States Capitol Police Internal Post Assignments.

This memorandum is in response to your analysis of the United States Capitol Police Internal Post Assignments which was at the request of the Capitol Police Board. I agree with your final analysis in civilianizing the posts within the Command Center and Communications Section. This would require an increase in civilian FTE but provide for no reduction in sworn personnel as these officers will be absorbed into the field for other mission sets. The Department has made this request through the legislative process; FY 17 Budget Request for additional civilian FTE for the purpose of civilianizing 48 positions, with the funding bill yet to be determined for FY 17.

Additionally, the Department has made a request through the Capitol Police Board, with the assistance of the Congressional leadership, to reduce the staffing requirement at the [REDACTED] you have identified within your report. We will continue to work with leadership to examine the use of Restricted Duty personnel in lieu of full duty personnel in this regard.

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to OIG's analysis of United States Capitol Police Internal Post Assignments. Your continued support of the men and women of the United States Capitol Police is greatly appreciated.

Very Respectfully,

Matthew R. Verderosa
Chief of Police

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Washington, DC 20510*



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