



UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Performance Audit United States Capitol Police Controls Over Ammunition

Report Number OIG-2014-03

March 2014

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UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE
WASHINGTON, DC 20003



OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

PREFACE

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) prepared this report pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. It is one of a series of audits, reviews, and investigative and special reports OIG prepares periodically as part of its oversight responsibility with respect to the United States Capitol Police (USCP) to identify and prevent fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement.

This report is the result of an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the office or function under review. It is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct observation, and a review of applicable documents.

We developed our recommendations on the basis of the best knowledge available to OIG and discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is my hope that the recommendations will result in more effective, efficient, and/or economical operations.

I express my appreciation to those contributing to the preparation of this report.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Fay F. Ropella".

Fay F. Ropella
Inspector General

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

Capitol Division First Responders Unit	CDFRU
Containment Emergency Response Team	CERT
Department of Homeland Security	DHS
Dignitary Protection Division	DPD
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center	FLETC
Fiscal Year	FY
Government Accountability Office	GAO
Government Printing Office	GPO
Hazardous Incident Response Division	HIRD
Library of Congress Division	LOC Division
Memorandum of Understanding	MOU
Office of Administration	OA
Office of Facilities and Logistics	OFL
Office of Financial Management	OFM
Office of Inspector General	OIG
Office of Professional Responsibility	OPR
Off Site Delivery Center	OSDC
Property and Asset Management Division	PAMD
Patrol Mobile Response Division	PMRD
Physical Skills Division	PSD
Standard Operating Procedure	SOP
Training Services Bureau	TSB
United States Capitol Police	USCP or Department

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

At the request of the Chief of Police, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted a performance audit of the United States Capitol Police (USCP or Department) controls over ammunition. The objectives of our audit were to determine: (1) effectiveness of USCP's internal controls over ammunition and ensure accountability of those sensitive items; (2) whether USCP complied with applicable policies and procedures, laws, and regulations; and (3) whether USCP inventory records reconciled to actual ammunition on hand and official inventory records. Our scope included controls, processes, and operations in place from October 1, 2011, through September 30, 2013.

Our audit revealed that the Department did not establish effective internal controls and processes that would ensure accountability of ammunition. The Department had not updated since 2008 its Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) used for accountability of ammunition. Although the Department has a draft SOP, that SOP is vague and does not provide specific detail about the proper accounting for ammunition. Likewise, once the Training Services Bureau, Physical Skills Division (PSD) issued ammunition, USCP Divisions did not have a mechanism such as written SOPs or internal control manuals as guidance for accountability. Furthermore, the Memorandum of Understanding with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for the use of the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) Cheltenham, Maryland, facilities and its annual reimbursable agreement were out-of-date.

In addition to accountability issues, duties related to the ordering, receiving, inventorying, controlling, and accounting for ammunition lacked segregation. Both misappropriation of inventory and errors, either intentional or unintentional, may go undetected when duties involving custody of inventory and access to inventory records are not appropriately segregated. Moreover, improving physical security over ammunition such as changing codes to combination locks, user names, and passwords would ensure that sensitive items are safeguarded against fraud, waste, misuse, and mismanagement.

The Department did not always comply with USCP Directive [REDACTED] (October 19, 2012) or SOP [REDACTED] (June 30, 2008), or industry best practices. For example, the Department did not (1) always notify Property and Asset Management Division (PAMD) of delivery of ammunition as required, (2) always file [REDACTED]¹ reports for lost/stolen/transferred/destroyed ammunition, or (3) conduct semi-annual or annual

¹ SOP [REDACTED] requires that PSD provide PAMD with a [REDACTED] for all lost/stolen/transferred/destroyed firearms, except for ammunition destroyed as a result of routine operations and training.

inventories as guidance requires. Best practices include developing SOPs, maintaining a perpetual (running) inventory of ammunition, and determining ammunition needs based on approved lesson training plans and/or operations. PSD and other divisions did not track, inventory, or account for training ammunition. As a result, ammunition became stockpiled. For example, one division had more than 3,280 rounds of M-4 ammunition on hand since 2007, which was not accounted for in Department inventory records or in a July 2013 inventory. We also estimated that another unit had ammunition valued at about \$23,000² stored in its armory that was not recorded in official control or inventory records. As a result, the Department did not have a complete or accurate inventory of ammunition because PSD and PAMD were not maintaining a perpetual inventory of daily ammunition transactions.

Consequently, OIG was unable to reconcile ammunition control records to on hand amounts. Our on-site 100-percent physical count (wall-to-wall inventory) of ammunition at the division level revealed differences in M-4 and shotgun rounds. Of the six sites reviewed, three showed more M-4 ammunition on hand than the records indicated. Differences for the M-4 ammunition ranged from as few as 112 to as many as 3,140 rounds. If ammunition records are not kept up-to-date and reconciled to actual on-hand amounts and control records, the Department may not be using its ammunition in the most efficient and effective manner and—more importantly—may not be detecting missing ammunition. In fact, during our audit scope, one division also reported missing ammunition several times.

Opportunities may exist for the Department to use its resources in a more efficient and effective manner. For example, the Department does not benefit from recycling spent shell casings generated at the firing range. In addition, the Department maintains ammunition that is not in a usable condition because there is no process for the destruction of confiscated and/or damaged ammunition.

To develop more efficient and effective controls over the accountability of ammunition to detect and prevent fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, we recommend that USCP establish detailed written internal controls and processes as well as update its MOU and reimbursable agreement with DHS FLETC. Those actions should ensure compliance with applicable guidance and best practices. We also recommend that the Department assign a trained Property Asset Manager to the firing range who will maintain the daily ammunition transactions in the Department's official accounting system, [REDACTED] thus ensuring an accurate and complete perpetual inventory and separating incompatible duties. Assignment of a civilian asset manager would relieve sworn officers of record keeping duties and allow them to conduct critical law enforcement duties. Furthermore, the Department should consult with the General Counsel to determine if USCP can receive funds generated by recycling spent shell casings as well as developing a process for destruction of confiscated and/or damaged ammunition. The complete list of recommendations is in Appendix A.


² Dollars rounded to the nearest thousand.

On February 18, 2014, OIG conducted an exit conference with Department officials and provided a draft report for comment. We incorporated the Department's comments as applicable and attached their response to the report in its entirety in Appendix B.

BACKGROUND

In July 2013, after the Capitol Division First Responders Unit (CDFRU) reported missing M-4 ammunition, the United States Capitol Police (USCP or Department) Chief of Police requested that the Office of Inspector General (OIG) conduct an audit to determine the effectiveness of internal controls over ammunition. The Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) conducted an investigation from April to May 2013 into the missing ammunition. The OPR investigation revealed inadequate documentation in support of missing items and inventories, unsecured equipment, and no established internal control or systematic procedures to ensure the accountability of ammunition.

According to Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) [REDACTED], [REDACTED] (June 30, 2008), the Training Services Bureau (TSB), Physical Skills Division (PSD) is responsible for issuing firearms and ammunition. PSD is also responsible for ordering, receiving, issuing, inventorying, accounting for, and controlling access to ammunition. PSD maintains its inventory of ammunition in its armory as shown in [REDACTED]. PSD issues ammunition to individuals and Divisions for use in operations and training. Sworn officers use training ammunition at the PSD firing range and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), in Cheltenham, Maryland. DHS provides ammunition to the USCP new recruits at FLETC Glynco, Georgia, to use while training. PSD also provides ammunition to TSB instructors assigned to FLETC Glynco for qualifications and training.



[REDACTED] is a commercial off-the-shelf software application that the Department designated as the official system for asset management. USCP's asset records are stored, processed, and maintained within [REDACTED]. According to USCP Directive [REDACTED], [REDACTED] (October 19, 2012), USCP must manage and control Department personal property consisting of assets that USCP considers sensitive and will be managed and tracked regardless of acquisition cost. Appendix C, *List of Sensitive Assets Tracked in* [REDACTED] lists ammunition as an item tracked in [REDACTED].

The Office of Facilities and Logistics (OFL) is responsible for ensuring that all Department Bureaus/Offices properly implement property and asset management procedures. The Property and Asset Management Division (PAMD) provides property accountability, inventory control, and related acquisition planning, central receiving, distribution, storage, utilization, maintenance, reutilization, and/or disposal services.

As of July 2013, the Department purchased during Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 and FY 2013,³ controlled explosives and ammunition totaling \$621,338 and \$653,861, respectively.

OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

OIG conducted a performance audit of the Department's controls over ammunition at the request of the Chief of Police. The objectives of our audit were to determine: (1) effectiveness of USCP's internal controls over ammunition and ensure accountability of those sensitive items; (2) whether USCP complied with applicable policies and procedures, laws, and regulations; and (3) whether USCP inventory records reconciled to actual ammunition on hand and official inventory records. Our scope included controls, processes, and operations in place from October 1, 2011, through September 30, 2013.

To accomplish our objectives, we interviewed officials in TSB, PSD, Patrol Mobile Response Division (PMRD), Containment Emergency Response Team (CERT), Dignitary Protection Division (DPD), House Division, Library of Congress Division (LOC Division), Senate Division, Capitol Division, Hazardous Incident Response Division (HIRD), and PAMD to gain an understanding of the following areas:

- Ammunition policies and procedures
- Internal controls over the accountability of ammunition
- The amount and types of ammunition on hand within the Department
- Divisions/Units within the Department that maintain an inventory of ammunition

We reviewed relevant policies and procedures related to accountability of ammunition. We also reviewed ammunition purchases for FY 2012 and FY 2013 as of July 24, 2013, that the Budget Division in the Office of Financial Management (OFM) maintains. Additionally, we reviewed ammunition inventory data (weapon systems) in [REDACTED] as well as ammunition inventory data maintained by PSD. Further, we conducted site visits to observe controls of ammunition at the armories that PSD, PMRD, CERT, DPD, House Division, LOC Division, Senate Division, Capitol Division, and HIRD use. We also conducted a 100-percent physical count of ammunition on hand in the armories that

³ USCP Budget Division provided ammunition purchase data (BOC 26.34) as of July 24, 2013.

PMRD, CERT, House Division, LOC Division, Senate Division, Capitol Division, and HIRD use.

To determine compliance, we reviewed the following guidance:

- USCP Directive [REDACTED], October 19, 2012.
- USCP Directive [REDACTED], May 28, 2013.
- Standard Operating Procedure [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] June 30, 2008.
- Standard Operating Procedure [REDACTED], [REDACTED]
[REDACTED], April 22, 2013.
- Draft Standard Operating Procedure [REDACTED], [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (*Emphasis Added*)
- Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Between *The Department of Homeland Security Federal Law Enforcement Training Center and The United States Capitol Police*, dated July 8, 2004.
- PSD Information Paper to TSB Deputy Chief dated August 2, 2013, Subject: *Weapons and Ammunition Accountability*.

As a legislative branch agency, many laws and regulations that apply to executive branch agencies do not apply to USCP. We believe, however, that those laws and regulations represent appropriate guidance and industry best practices. We reviewed guidance from the Government Accountability Office (GAO); U.S. Department of Justice OIG; U.S. Department of the Army; U.S. Air Force Audit Agency, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe; and DHS FLETC. We also interviewed a former firing instructor and DHS FLETC to determine industry practices in addition to economy and efficiencies for maximizing mission capability.

We conducted this performance audit in Washington, D.C., from September 2013 through February 2014 in accordance with *Government Auditing Standards*, issued by the Comptroller General of the United States, 2011 revision, referred to as generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We discussed our observations and conclusions with management officials on February 18, 2014, and included their comments in their entirety in Appendix B.

RESULTS

The Department did not establish effective internal controls and processes that could mitigate fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement over a sensitive item such as ammunition. The Department also did not always comply with guidance or best practices. Because the Department did not maintain a perpetual inventory system, OIG could not reconcile ammunition inventory records to on hand ammunition or inventory control records. During this time of budget constraints, the Department has opportunities to promote cost-savings techniques and use its limited resources in a more efficient and effective manner.

Ineffective Internal Controls

The Department did not establish effective internal controls and processes that would ensure accountability over ammunition. GAO, *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government; Appropriate Documentation of Transactions and Internal Control* (AIMD-00-21.3.1, November 1, 1999), states:

... that internal control and all transactions and other significant events need to be clearly documented, and the documentation should be readily available for examination. The documentation should appear in management directives, administrative policies, or operating manuals and may be in paper or electronic form. All documentation and records should be properly managed and maintained.

The Department's SOP, used for accountability over ammunition, is outdated and vague. Once PSD issues ammunition, there are no written guidance such as SOPs or internal control manuals maintained by Divisions/Units for accountability of ammunition. The MOU with DHS for the use of FLETC facilities in Cheltenham, along with the annual reimbursable agreement, were also outdated. In addition, we discovered inadequate segregation of duties and physical security over ammunition.

Outdated and Vague Standard Operating Procedures

The Department had not updated, SOP [REDACTED] : [REDACTED], since June 30, 2008. As a result, the SOP does not reflect up-to-date procedures for the accountability of ammunition. One example of out-of-date information includes a reporting mechanism no longer used—the Computerized PAMD log or [REDACTED] report. Although the Department revised its SOP in June 2008, almost 2 years after it implemented [REDACTED] the out-of-date information about the PAMD log and [REDACTED] report had not been updated.

The Department drafted SOP [REDACTED] and published an information paper entitled [REDACTED]. However, those documents lack detail about accounting procedures for ammunition. For example, the draft SOP does not establish a

⁴ According to [REDACTED], the [REDACTED] report is a computerized PAMD receiving log.

specific timetable or schedule for conducting inventories or provide detailed procedures such as when to reorder or rotate ammunition. While it does rotate the stock of training ammunition located in its armory, PSD does not rotate ammunition at the Division level. A Senate Division official stated that shotgun ammunition had been on hand in its armory since 2005. In addition, because of budget concerns, the Department did not use training ammunition stored at FLETC Cheltenham since 2012. As in long-term food storage, the key to successfully storing ammunition is to rotate ammunition as often as possible. Additionally, if the Department is not regularly firing ammunition at the Division level, periodic reviews should be made to check for corrosion and ensure that stock is ready to fire when needed.

According to the Office of Administration (OA), the Office of Policy and Management Systems and TSB are in the process of making final changes to the draft SOP. OA stated that the Department will consider the findings and recommendations from this report in the final version of the SOP.

Although the August 2, 2013, information paper recommends that Divisions develop specific procedures that address accountability over ammunition, the Department did not establish any formal SOPs or internal controls related to their specific area as of February 2014. We did note that after the CDFRU identified missing ammunition, it implemented some control procedures identified in several emails dated April 2013. Nevertheless, the same Division reported missing ammunition again in January 2014. An official from the LOC Division provided a draft SOP that it uses for ammunition accountability. However, the draft SOP was undated and did not have a title. The draft states that its purpose is to set forth procedures for the safe issuance return, and accountability of firearms and ammunition stored in the LOC Division Armory.

Outdated Memorandum of Understanding

The MOU with DHS on the FLETC facilities in Cheltenham is out-of-date. Although the original agreement required that the Department update the MOU every 5 years, the Department has not updated the MOU with the DHS since 2004. According to the MOU:

Due to unforeseen events and circumstances, both the FLETC and the USCP agree that is mutually beneficial to review and, when necessary, revise the MOA on a regular basis. **The first such review will take place five (5) years after the signing of the MOA and every five years thereafter.** *(Emphasis Added)*

The Department did not sign its annual MOU reimbursable support agreement with DHS. According to the Department's Procurement Officer, as of March 2014 the Department does not have a current agreement with FLETC. The Department is working to finalize an agreement, which, according to the Procurement Officer, would be retroactive to October 2013. Because of outdated and vague guidance and an outdated MOU, controls over ammunition were not adequate and largely undocumented.

Inadequate Segregation of Duties

The Department did not maintain adequate segregation of duties related to the accountability of ammunition. *GAO Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government; Segregation of Duties* (AIMD-00-21.3.1, November 1, 1999), states:

Key duties and responsibilities need to be divided or segregated among different people to reduce the risk of error or fraud. This should include separating the responsibilities for authorizing transactions, processing and recording them, reviewing the transactions, and handling any related assets. No one individual should control all key aspects of a transaction or event.

Although the Department separates key duties between PAMD and TSB, our analysis showed that PSD controls ordering, receiving, record keeping, and access over ammunition.

Physical Security Needs Improvement

The Department should improve physical security over ammunition. SOP [REDACTED] states that ammunition must be stored in a locked safe within the range and/or within the alarmed armory at the range. Although the PSD firing range and Divisions stored ammunition behind locked doors, we found that personnel not assigned to the secure areas had access to these locked doors and in some cases the keypad lock to the armories. Our comparison of the number of individuals with access to the PSD range and CERT armory to the number of individuals assigned to those areas revealed that:

30 individuals had access to the TSB/PSD firing range per data provided by Security Services Bureau (SSB); yet, only 16 individuals were assigned to TSB/PSD, according to PoliceNet.

73 individuals had access to the CERT armory per data provided by SSB; yet, only 34 individuals were assigned to CERT, according to PoliceNet.

Several PSD officers maintained informal Excel spreadsheet records, entered data in [REDACTED] and had access to its vault. Such unrestricted access to ammunition and records is considered a significant weakness in physical security at the PSD range and CERT armory. Furthermore, when sworn officers transfer weapons to one another between the various shifts, they do not always account for ammunition before accepting custody. As a result, when ammunition is missing, the Department cannot determine who the responsible party is.

A Department official stated that DPD agents sometimes store ammunition overnight in their vehicle for a next-day training class. Overnight ammunition storage is a concern because in October 2013 70 boxes of ammunition were stolen from a trailer owned by the Federal Air Marshal Program near Baltimore-Washington Thurgood Marshall International Airport in Maryland. Again in February 2014, according to news reports, ammunition was stolen from an unmarked law enforcement vehicle in Anne Arundel County, Maryland.

Conclusions

The Department did not establish effective internal controls and processes that would ensure accountability of ammunition. Guidance on accountability of ammunition was outdated, vague, or nonexistent. In addition, an MOU with DHS FLETC was out-of-date, and the Department did not sign its annual reimbursable agreement with DHS. As well, the Department did not have adequate segregation of duties and physical security over ammunition.

Well-written and up-to-date policies and procedures help guide organizations, managers and supervisors in making decisions, training, and handling issues that relate to operations, safety, and health. Both misappropriation of inventory and errors, either intentional or unintentional, may go undetected when duties involving custody of inventory and access to records are not appropriately segregated and ammunition is not always safeguarded. Thus, OIG makes the following recommendations.

Recommendation 1: We recommend that the United States Capitol Police finalize its draft Standard Operating Procedure [REDACTED], and establish detailed procedures and practices such as reorder points and rotation of stock to ensure accountability of ammunition and communicate those controls to all personnel.

Recommendation 2: We recommend that the United States Capitol Police review and finalize its Memorandum of Understanding with the Department of Homeland Security related to the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center at Cheltenham, Maryland, and establish a final reimbursable agreement for Fiscal Year 2014.

Recommendation 3: We recommend that the United States Capitol Police ensure that key duties and responsibilities related to ammunition are divided or segregated among a variety of personnel to reduce the risk of fraud, waste, and mismanagement.

Recommendation 4: We recommend that the United States Capitol Police enhance physical security by restricting access to ammunition changing codes to combination locks, user names, and passwords, if applicable, and provide read-only access to inventory records. In addition, management should hold the applicable officer and custodian or both accountable for missing ammunition when a shared weapon system is transferred between shifts and officers.

Noncompliance with Department Guidance

USCP did not always comply with USCP Directive [REDACTED], SOP [REDACTED] or best practices. For example, the Department **did not** (1) **always** notify PAMD of delivery of ammunition as required, (2) always file [REDACTED]⁵ missing reports, or (3) conduct semi-annual or annual inventories as required. In addition, PSD or Divisions did not track ammunition used for training, which resulted in stockpiled ammunition. As a result, the official inventory system, [REDACTED] did not have a complete or accurate inventory of ammunition.

Inadequate Notification of Ammunition Shipments

USCP Directive [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
(October 19, 2012), states:

1. Personal property is delivered to the USCP. In most cases, property will be delivered directly to the PAMD storeroom in the GPO Building
2. In some cases, property may be delivered to other USCP locations. Storeroom Custodians who plan to have personal property delivered to a location other than the PAMD storeroom should contact PAMD prior to the order being delivered so that a PAMD representative can be scheduled to formally receive the property. *(Emphasis Added)*


Furthermore, Standard Operating Procedure [REDACTED] requires:

All shipments of firearms and ammunition will be shipped to Off Site Delivery Center (OSDC). Once received by OSDC, an employee of PAMD will respond and verify that the delivery matches the order. The PAMD employee will record all serial numbers and forward the paperwork to OFM. PSD and PAMD representatives will respond to OSDC to receive ammunition. PAMD will verify accuracy of the shipment and PSD will sign for ammunition at OSDC. PSD will then take ammunition. PSD may also attempt to schedule delivery of ammunition so that PAMD and PSD can plan for its arrival. If OSDC must store the firearms and ammunition overnight, there is a secure, alarmed facility in which to store the items until PSD and PAMD respond to retrieve the items.

The review and analysis of ammunition purchases for FYs 2012 and 2013, as of July 2013, showed that TSB did not notify PAMD of ammunition deliveries 88 percent (22 of 25) of the time as shown in Exhibit 1. As a result, PAMD did not update its official inventory records in [REDACTED]

⁵ SOP [REDACTED] requires PSD to PAMD with [REDACTED] for all lost/stolen/transferred/destroyed firearms, except for ammunition destroyed as a result of routine operations and training.

Exhibit 1 - Notification of Ammunition Purchases FYs 2012 and 2013



Source: Ammunition purchase documentation for FYs 2012 and 2013, as of July 2013, provided by OFM and PAMD.

Inadequate Notification of Missing/Damaged Ammunition

USCP Directive

(October 19, 2012), states:

Anytime that an item is missing, damaged, destroyed, or cannibalized, a [REDACTED] must be completed immediately and reported through the appropriate chain of command.

TSB and the Divisions did not always notify PAMD of missing or damaged ammunition. In an October 31, 2013, meeting, PAMD officials stated they were not aware of missing ammunition in CDFRU, which resulted in the OPR investigation (April through May 2013). Subsequently, in an October 31, 2013, email, PAMD confirmed that CDFRU did not file a [REDACTED] report for the missing ammunition as required.

Inventories Not Conducted on Routine Basis

USCP Directive

(October 19, 2012), requires

A physical inventory for personal property will be conducted annually through the property custodian inventory reporting process.

Additionally, SOP [REDACTED] states:

PSD will conduct semi-annual inventories of firearms and ammunition, and reconcile these inventories with PAMD's report [REDACTED] and ammunition inventory report. The inventories will be conducted in December and June. PSD will request an up-to-date [REDACTED] report and ammunition inventory report from PAMD for the inventories. Both inventories will be conducted jointly by two employees so that each is able to verify the other's work. The December inventory will be conducted by one PSD employee and one PAMD employee....Upon the conclusion of the December inventory, PSD and OFM will jointly reconcile their firearms and ammunition inventories.

Our audit revealed that the Department did not conduct the required semi-annual or annual inventories of ammunition or reconciliation of records. According to PAMD, ammunition is not included in annual inventories because it is considered to be expendable supplies. USCP Directive [REDACTED] states it is the policy of USCP to manage and control Department personal property that consists of assets the USCP considers to be sensitive and will manage and track regardless of their acquisition cost. The Directive identifies ammunition as a sensitive item tracked in [REDACTED]. PSD did, however, conduct an inventory in July 2013, after CDFRU identified missing ammunition.

Inadequate Controls over Training Ammunition


GAO, *Internal Control Standards*,⁶ states an agency must establish physical control to secure and safeguard vulnerable assets. Examples of controls include security for and limited access to assets such as any cash, securities, inventories, and equipment vulnerable to risk of loss or unauthorized use. Such assets should be periodically counted and compared to control records.

Other best practices include developing SOPs, keeping a perpetual inventory of ammunition, determining ammunition needs based on an approved lesson plan and course of fire, not allowing ammunition to be removed from its packing containers until required for use, documenting ammunition consumption in records such as ammunition and/or scoring logs, returning leftover ammunition at the end of a session, and adding it back into the overall inventory, and reconciling ammunition turn-ins with the original issue documents and consumption records.

The PSD firing range and Divisions did not track or maintain an inventory over training ammunition. In addition, management chose expediency over potential vulnerabilities. As [REDACTED] reveals, PSD stores loose ammunition, used for qualifications, in ammunition cans. According to PSD, storing loose ammunition in cans saves time. PSD also maintained ammunition in a storage room located within the firing instructor office at the range, which is unlocked during the day. According to PSD, the

⁶ GAO/AIMS-00-21.3.1.

ammunition is issued to TSB and kept on a rack so that it may be accessed quicker for qualifications and trainings held at the range.



Officials of PSD stated that only full cases of ammunition are returned and recorded and placed into the range ammunition vault after a training class. According to the TSB Training Tracker, no PSD sworn officer has had training in inventory management.

Divisions also do not track training ammunition. In addition, Divisions that maintain training ammunition could not provide an approved lesson

plan or course of fire for the use of training ammunition. For example, CERT obtains ammunition for training from PSD, but does not return unused ammunition. According to a CERT official, each team has a training log containing daily activity sheets that note the number of rounds expended by each individual as well as total rounds expended for each training session. However, CERT does not reconcile the activity sheets to the ammunition that is on hand in its armory. In addition, CERT could not provide an approved training plan. A CERT official stated that operators are able to look at the ammunition and tell how much is stored in its armory. That same official estimated that CERT had about 10,000 to 20,000 rounds of ammunition in its armory. Yet, during a November 13, 2013, site visit, we conducted a 100-percent wall-to-wall inventory and physical count of the ammunition and identified 33,615 rounds of various types of ammunition with an estimated cost of about \$23,000⁷ in the CERT Armory. PSD and PAMD did not have a record of the ammunition we inventoried.

In another instance we inventoried 3,280 rounds of M-4 ammunition on hand at PMRD that had been there since 2007. We noted that 1,640 rounds of M-4 ammunition were missing based on PSD issuance records for the same period. When we followed up with PSD regarding this issue, an official stated:

The ammunition in question was possibly issued in 2007 for cross-training with CERT. The range has a record of issuing PD (PMRD) 3 cases of M-4 ammunition. During that

⁷ Dollars rounded to the nearest thousand.

time, CERT may have assisted with ammunition since they were in charge of the training and shared the same Command.

CERT, PMRD, and PSD could not provide a record of the details of how, where, when, or who expended the missing ammunition. In addition, PAMD and PSD could not account for the excess ammunition in [REDACTED] or records for PSD. The Department could save money and manage its ammunition inventory more efficiently and effectively maximizing mission capability if an individual with inventory management training recorded all ammunition transactions in [REDACTED]. Inventory management would ensure that sensitive items such as ammunition are properly recorded and expended in a timely manner.

Conclusions

USCP did not always comply with USCP guidance or the industry's best practices. For example, the Department **did not** (1) always notify PAMD of delivery of ammunition as required, (2) always file [REDACTED]⁸ missing reports, or (3) conduct required semi-annual or annual inventories. Documenting the consumption of training ammunition in records such as ammunition and/or scoring logs, returning leftover ammunition at the end of a session, adding it into the overall inventory, and reconciling ammunition turn-ins with the original issue documents and consumption records would provide a more complete record of ammunition transactions and management could more readily monitor quantities of ammunition. Thus, OIG makes the following recommendations.

Recommendation 5: We recommend the United States Capitol Police immediately enforce compliance of United States Capitol Police Directive [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and Standard Operating Procedure [REDACTED], ensuring that (1) transactions are recorded in the official inventory system including missing/damaged ammo and (2) ammunition is inventoried periodically and reconciled to control records.

Recommendation 6: We recommend the United States Capitol Police immediately establish detailed procedures for training ammunition to use best practices such as keeping a perpetual inventory of ammunition, providing ammunition with only an approved lesson plan accompanied by the course of fire, not allowing ammunition to be removed from packing containers until required for use, documenting ammunition consumption in records such as ammunition and/or scoring logs, returning leftover ammunition at the end of a session, and adding it back into the overall inventory, and reconciling ammunition turn-ins with the original issue documents and consumption records.

⁸ SOP [REDACTED] requires PSD to provide PAMD with [REDACTED] for all lost/stolen/transferred/destroyed firearms, except for ammunition destroyed as a result of routine operations and training.

Recommendation 7: We recommend the United States Capitol Police immediately consider reassigning a trained Property Asset Management Division employee to the Physical Skills Division Armory to receive and record daily ammunition transactions in the official inventory system, [REDACTED] thereby ensuring an accurate and complete perpetual inventory. In addition, this independent employee should conduct quarterly inventories of all armories to ensure accountability over ammunition. This would relieve sworn officers of administrative record keeping and allow them to conduct critical law enforcement duties.

Official Ammunition Records Did Not Reconcile

USCP Directive [REDACTED]
(October 19, 2012), states:

1. [REDACTED] is the official USCP system of record for all USCP personal property.
2. The information in [REDACTED] must be complete and accurate for all USCP personal property.
3. Property related transactions (issuing to a Division, Section, or individual; returning to a storeroom; designating surplus; etc.) must be recorded in [REDACTED]

The official inventory records for ammunition were not complete and not accurate because ammunition transactions were not recorded in the official inventory system.

OIG could not reconcile the on-hand inventory with official records. Although the Department maintains [REDACTED] PSD uses Excel spreadsheets to track ammunition use. In addition, PSD considers only sealed boxes of ammunition as on hand—loose or returned ammunition is not considered in ammunition balances. As a result of informal record keeping by PSD, no up-to-date balances of ammunition quantities on hand or historical usage information other than purchases are recorded in [REDACTED]

In an effort to determine actual on-hand amounts, we compared PSD and [REDACTED] records. We identified 26 types of ammunition recorded in [REDACTED] while PSD showed only 9 types of ammunition as in Appendix C. [REDACTED] and PSD listed seven types of the same ammunition (see Table 1). None of those seven types of ammunition reconciled with inventory numbers shown in [REDACTED] and data maintained by PSD with differences ranging from 18,488 to 307,500 rounds. For example, [REDACTED] listed 87,740 rounds of ammunition for [REDACTED], while PSD data showed 395,240, a difference of 307,500 rounds.

Table 1. Types of Ammunition Recorded in [REDACTED] and PSD Records				
[REDACTED] (Control Record)		PSD Armory Tracking Spread Sheets		Difference
Description	Balance	Description	Balance	
[REDACTED]	1,030,020	[REDACTED]	1,150,000	-119,980
[REDACTED]	193,000	[REDACTED]	54,000	139,000
[REDACTED]	87,740	[REDACTED]	395,240	-307,500
[REDACTED]	36,100	[REDACTED]	2,000	34,100
[REDACTED]	31,972	[REDACTED]	50,460	-18,488
[REDACTED]	11,000	[REDACTED]	94,500	-83,500
[REDACTED]	9,500	[REDACTED]	42,500	-33,000

Source: PAMD provided [REDACTED] data and TSB provided ammunition inventory data as of November 13, 2013.

According to an official in TSB, [REDACTED] and PSD inventory amounts differed because of different inventory objectives and requirements. PSD logbooks and the electronic database reflect current ammunition types and amounts stored at the range that are used for operations and mandatory training. As previously stated, PSD does not use [REDACTED] to track the daily usage of ammunition. However, we did note that the PSD Armory has several computers with [REDACTED] and TSB provided documentation identifying several officers trained on this system.

PSD issues each Division a set amount of weapons for operational purposes. However, PAMD and PSD could not provide the actual established or on hand balance of ammunition issued to each Division. PSD provided spreadsheets from [REDACTED] of weapon systems issued to each Division as of December 6, 2013. According to PSD, only weapon systems are recorded in [REDACTED] and not ammunition. According to PSD, each M-4 rifle weapon system listed by serial number is issued with [REDACTED] rounds and each shotgun weapon system is issued with [REDACTED] rounds, as shown in Table 2. Once PSD issues the weapons systems to the Divisions, none of the totals should change.

Table 2. Items Included in a Weapons System	
Type of Weapon	Issued with Weapon per TSB
M-4 Rifle	
Shotgun	

Source: TSB Official.

Because of those circumstances, a complete listing of ammunition balances was not available. Thus, to determine the amount of ammunition that should be on hand at each Division, we multiplied the amount of each M-4 weapon system by ■ rounds and each shotgun weapon system by ■ rounds. After conducting an on-site 100-percent physical count of ammunition on hand at six locations (PMRD, Capitol Division, House Division, Senate Division, LOC Division, and HIRD), we noted that while the number of weapons reconciled to data provided by PSD, the number of rounds of M-4 ammunition differed. In fact, our count showed more on hand at three of six sites than PSD records. Differences ranged from 112 to 3,140 rounds as shown in Table 3. For example, PSD records showed that it issued 2,100 rounds of M-4 ammunition to PMRD, while our count revealed 5,240—a difference of 3,140 rounds.

Table 3. M-4 Rifle Ammunition			
Division	Issued Rounds provided by TSB	Rounds on hand per OIG Inventory	Difference
HIRD	0	0	0
PMRD	2,100	5,240	3,140
Capitol	7,000	8,490	1,490
House	1,400	1,512	112
LOC	700	700	0
Senate	1,400	1,400	0

Source: Data provided by TSB as of December 6, 2013.

OIG conducted inventories December 16 through 19, 2013.

The difference in M-4 ammunition was the result of the 3,280 rounds on hand at PMRD, since 2007, which were not recorded in any records. PMRD also was issued only 14 magazines and pouches although it was issued 15 rifles. The difference of 1,490 rounds noted in the Capitol Division consists of 9 rapid deploy bags, 2 spare pouches, and 6 spare rounds issued to the Division, which were not recorded in any records. The difference of 112 rounds noted in the House Division was the result of the Division having possession of 4 additional magazines.

Our on-site count also revealed that five of six sites had on hand more shotgun ammunition than recorded. Differences ranged from 63 to 445 rounds as shown in Table 4. For example, PSD showed that it had issued 55 shotgun shells to the LOC Division, while our inventory identified 500 shells on hand—a difference of 445.

Table 4. Shotgun Ammunition as of December 6, 2013			
Division	Issued Rounds TSB	Rounds on hand per OIG Inventory	Difference
HIRD	22	128	106
PMRD	132	195	63
Capitol	0	0	0
House	66	143	77
LOC	55	500	445
Senate	55	152	97

Source: Data provided by TSB as of December 6, 2013 and OIG generated data from inventory conducted December 16 through 19, 2013.

We were not able to determine the cause of the differences between our physical count and the amount of shotgun rounds PSD showed it had issued to the Divisions.

After the Capitol Division reported missing ammunition, PSD Armory conducted an inventory July 29 through 31, 2013, at each Division. A PSD informational paper dated August 2, 2013, states:

The completed inspection confirmed the correct inventory of all divisions as it is recorded in [REDACTED] database system. (Emphasis Added)

OIG also compared its 100-percent physical count to the PSD inventory for Divisions with fixed ammunition balances. We found M-4 and shotgun ammunition exceeded the amounts recorded in the [REDACTED] system and on the information paper dated August 2, 2013. For example, at three of six sites, M-4 ammunition differences ranged from 112 to 3,252 rounds as shown in Table 5.

Table 5. M-4 Rifle Ammunition			
Division	Rounds PSD	Rounds OIG Site Visit	Difference
HIRD	0	0	0
PMRD*	1,988	5,240	3,252
Capitol	7,000	8,490	1,490
House	1,400	1,512	112
LOC	700	700	0
Senate	1,400	1,400	0

Source: *Weapons and Ammunition Accountability* (August 2, 2013) and OIG on-site inventory. December 16 through 19, 2013.

* Inventory notes 112 rounds missing (1 Pouch and 4 Magazines).

Additionally, at four of six sites, shotgun ammunition differences ranged from 1 to 116 rounds as shown in Table 6.

Table 6. Shotgun Ammunition			
Division	Shells PSD	Shells on hand per OIG Site Visit	Difference
HIRD	12	128	116
PMRD	192	195	3
Capitol	0	0	0
House	142	143	1
LOC	400	500	100
Senate	152	152	0

Source: *Weapons and Ammunition Accountability* (August 2, 2013) and OIG generated data from inventory conducted December 16 through 19, 2013.

Conclusions

and PSD records were not complete and not accurate. OIG could not reconcile on-hand amounts to control records. Our on-site count at the Division level showed significant differences in ammunition amounts. If inventory records for ammunition are not kept up-to-date and accurate reconciliations with actual ammunition on hand cannot be performed, then the Department may not be using its ammunition in the most efficient and effective manner or detect missing ammunition. OIG makes the following recommendation.

Recommendation 8: We recommend the United States Capitol Police immediately conduct a 100-percent physical count of ammunition with a trained Property Asset Management Division employee and Physical Skills Division sworn officer and reconcile the count with control records, thereby

ensuring an accurate and complete perpetual inventory and establishing ammunition levels at each Division.

Opportunities to Use Resources in a More Efficient and Effective Manner

USCP may have opportunities to use resources in a more efficient and effective manner. As of February 2014, the Department does not recycle spent shell casings generated at the firing range. Additionally, no process is in place for destruction of confiscated and/or damaged ammunition.

Recycling Spent Shell Casings

Funds from recycling spent shell casings generated at the firing range did not benefit USCP. [REDACTED]

In an undated letter in response to USCP Upfront [REDACTED], [REDACTED] (May 7, 2013), a PSD Firearms Instructor at the firing range suggested: "Brass casings have significant value . . . If we were to maintain control of our brass and recycle it on our own we could generate between \$5,000 and \$10,000 per year."

Based on the recycling value of spent brass and nickel-plated shell casings and how frequently shell casings are picked up from the range, OIG estimated annual recycling value of the spent shell casings could generate from \$12,000 to \$46,000⁹.

Although Department guidance states that PAMD handles disposal of property, the guidance does not address recycling. In fact, PAMD officials were not aware of how the spent brass shell casings are recycled.

Disposal of Confiscated and/or Damaged Ammunition

USCP Directive [REDACTED]

⁹ Dollars rounded to the nearest thousand.

[REDACTED] dated October 19, 2012, requires that when property becomes excess to the needs of the Department, a Bureau/Office, Division, or Section, must complete a [REDACTED] for assets. It further states:

1. Whenever property is in an unusable state or condition, the Storeroom Custodian will include a statement requesting destruction of the property in the [REDACTED]. The statement will explain that the property has no commercial value and the estimated cost of its continued care and handling would exceed the estimated proceeds from its sale.

[REDACTED]

During the audit, we observed that PSD Armory had a shelf of confiscated and/or damaged ammunition that should have been destroyed. In addition, the CERT Armory had a bucket of ammunition taken out of operational use as a result of wear and tear [REDACTED]

However, a PAMD official stated that the Department does not have a process for destruction of confiscated and/or damaged ammunition.

Conclusions

The recycling value of the spent shell casings generated at the firing range may provide additional resources for the Department. Additionally, no process is in place for the destruction of confiscated and/or damaged ammunition, and the Department is maintaining ammunition that is not in a usable condition. To ensure that USCP uses its scarce resources in the most efficient and effective manner, OIG makes the following recommendations.

Recommendation 9: We recommend the United States Capitol Police consult with its General Counsel to determine if the Department has the authority to recycle and receive such funds. If not, the Department should consider obtaining such authority. If so, the Department should develop a process for receiving funds for the recycling value of the spent shell casings generated at the firing range.

Recommendation 10: We recommend the United States Capitol Police develop a process for destruction of confiscated and/or damaged ammunition.

APPENDICES

Listing of Recommendations

Recommendation 1: We recommend that the United States Capitol Police finalize its draft Standard Operating Procedure [REDACTED], and establish detailed procedures and practices such as reorder points and rotation of stock to ensure accountability of ammunition and communicate those controls to all personnel.

Recommendation 2: We recommend that the United States Capitol Police review and finalize its Memorandum of Understanding with the Department of Homeland Security related to the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center at Cheltenham, Maryland, and establish a final reimbursable agreement for Fiscal Year 2014.

Recommendation 3: We recommend that the United States Capitol Police ensure that key duties and responsibilities related to ammunition are divided or segregated among a variety of personnel to reduce the risk of fraud, waste, and mismanagement.

Recommendation 4: We recommend that the United States Capitol Police enhance physical security by restricting access to ammunition changing codes to combination locks, user names, and passwords, if applicable, and provide read-only access to inventory records. In addition, management should hold the applicable officer and custodian or both accountable for missing ammunition when a shared weapon system is transferred between shifts and officers.

Recommendation 5: We recommend the United States Capitol Police immediately enforce compliance of United States Capitol Police Directive [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and Standard Operating Procedure [REDACTED], ensuring that (1) transactions are recorded in the official inventory system including missing/damaged ammo and (2) ammunition is inventoried periodically and reconciled to control records.

Recommendation 6: We recommend the United States Capitol Police immediately establish detailed procedures for training ammunition to use best practices such as keeping a perpetual inventory of ammunition, providing ammunition with only an approved lesson plan accompanied by the course of fire, not allowing ammunition to be removed from packing containers until required for use, documenting ammunition consumption in records such as ammunition and/or scoring logs, returning leftover ammunition at the end of a session, and adding it back into the overall inventory, and reconciling ammunition turn-ins with the original issue documents and consumption records.

Recommendation 7: We recommend the United States Capitol Police immediately consider reassigning a trained Property Asset Management Division employee to the Physical Skills Division Armory to receive and record daily ammunition transactions in the official inventory system, [REDACTED] thereby ensuring an accurate and complete perpetual inventory. In addition, this independent employee should conduct quarterly inventories all armories to ensure accountability over ammunition. This would relieve sworn officers of administrative record keeping and allow them to conduct critical law enforcement duties.

Recommendation 8: We recommend the United States Capitol Police immediately conduct a 100-percent physical count of ammunition with a trained Property Asset Management Division employee and Physical Skills Division sworn officer and reconcile the count with control records, thereby ensuring an accurate and complete perpetual inventory and establishing ammunition levels at each Division.

Recommendation 9: We recommend the United States Capitol Police consult with its General Counsel to determine if the Department has the authority to recycle and receive such funds. If not, the Department should consider obtaining such authority. If so, the Department should develop a process for receiving funds for the recycling value of the spent shell casings generated at the firing range.

Recommendation 10: We recommend the United States Capitol Police develop a process for destruction of confiscated and/or damaged ammunition.

DEPARTMENT COMMENTS



UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
180 D STREET, NE
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-7218

Phone: 202-544-5554

March 26, 2014

COP130946

MEMORANDUM

TO: Ms. Fay F. Ropella, CPA, CFE
Inspector General

FROM: Kim C. Dine
Chief of Police

SUBJECT: Response to OIG draft report on its *Performance Audit of USCP Controls Over Ammunition* (Report No. OIG-2014-03)

The purpose of this memorandum is to provide the United States Capitol Police response to the recommendations contained within the Office of Inspector General's (OIG's) draft report *Performance Audit of USCP Controls Over Ammunition* (Report No. OIG-2014-03).

Recommendation 1: *We recommend that the United States Capitol Police finalize its draft Standard Operating Procedure [REDACTED] and establish detailed procedures and practices such as reorder points and rotation of stock to ensure accountability of ammunition and communicate those controls to all personnel.*

USCP Response: The Department agrees with this recommendation. The Department is finalizing this Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). While this SOP is under revision, an Interim Guidance will be issued in April to include the segregation of duties. Property and Asset Management (PAMD) and Training Services Bureau (TSB) personnel will be working together to accomplish this SOP.

Recommendation 2: *We recommend that the United States Capitol Police review and finalize its Memorandum of Understanding with the Department of Homeland Security related to the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center at Cheltenham, Maryland, and establish a final reimbursable agreement for Fiscal Year 2014.*

USCP Response: The Department agrees with this recommendation. The Office of Procurement is awaiting the revised agreed upon Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) from the Department of Homeland Security. Once the MOU is received, the Procurement Office will issue the award.

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DEPARTMENT COMMENTS

Recommendation 3: *We recommend that the United States Capitol Police ensure that key duties and responsibilities related to ammunition are divided or segregated among a variety of personnel to reduce the risk of fraud, waste, and mismanagement.*

USCP Response: The Department agrees with this recommendation. Effective March 24, 2014, PAMD took over accountability of all weapons, weapons parts and ammunition. PAMD personnel will be stationed at the Range to have on-site control and accountability.

Recommendation 4: *We recommend that the United States Capitol Police enhance physical security by restricting access to ammunition changing codes to combination locks, user names, and passwords, if applicable, and provide read-only access to inventory records. In addition, management should hold the applicable officer and custodian or both accountable for missing ammunition when a shared weapon system is transferred between shifts and officers.*

USCP Response: The Department agrees with this recommendation and is taking steps to work across the Department to implement controls and accountability to achieve this recommendation. The Department expects to have this necessary process in place within the next 90 days.

Recommendation 5: We recommend that the United States Capitol Police immediately enforce compliance of United States Capitol Police Directive [REDACTED] and Standard Operating Procedure [REDACTED] ensuring that (1) transactions are recorded in the official inventory system including missing/damaged ammo and (2) ammunition is inventoried periodically and reconciled to control records.

USCP Response: The Department agrees with this recommendation. Effective March 24, 2014, PAMD took control of all weapons, weapons parts and ammunition, to include maintenance of such records in [REDACTED] Property System as well as the ordering and restocking of weapons, weapon parts and ammunition for the Department.

Recommendation 6: We recommend that the United States Capitol Police immediately establish detailed procedures for training ammunition to use best practices such as keeping a perpetual inventory of ammunition, providing ammunition with only an approved lesson plan accompanied by the course of fire, not allowing ammunition to be removed from packing containers until required for use, documenting ammunition consumption in records such as ammunition and/or scoring logs, returning leftover ammunition at the end of a session, and adding it back into the overall inventory, and reconciling ammunition turn-ins with the original issue documents and consumption records.

USCP Response: The Department agrees with this recommendation. PAMD and TSB Range personnel are developing the system and protocols needed to implement this recommendation. The Department expects to implement this process in the next 90 days.

Recommendation 7: We recommend the United States Capitol Police immediately consider reassigning a trained PAMD employee to the Physical Skills Division Armory to receive and record daily ammunition transactions in the official inventory system, [REDACTED] thereby ensuring

DEPARTMENT COMMENTS

an accurate and complete perpetual inventory. In addition, this independent employee should conduct quarterly inventories to all armories to ensure accountability over ammunition. This would relieve sworn officers of administrative record keeping and allow them to conduct critical law enforcement duties.

USCP Response: The Department agrees with this recommendation. Effective March 24, 2014, PAMD personnel were assigned to the Range and assumed control and accountability for weapons, weapon parts and ammunition for the Department. These personnel will report directly to the Director of PAMD to ensure the segregation of duties between TSB, PSD and PAMD.

Recommendation 8: We recommend the United States Capitol Police immediately conduct a 100-percent physical count of ammunition with a trained PAMD employee and Physical Skills Division sworn officer and reconcile the count with control records, thereby ensuring an accurate and complete perpetual inventory and establishing ammunition levels at each Division.

USCP Response: The Department agrees with this recommendation. Beginning March 24, 2014, PAMD began a complete inventory of weapons, weapon parts and ammunition ensuring there is reconciliation between invoices, actual stock and inventory records contained in the [REDACTED] System. The Department expects to complete this inventory within 45 days.

Recommendation 9: We recommend the United States Capitol Police consult with its General Counsel to determine if the Department has the authority to recycle and receive such funds. If not, the Department should consider obtaining such authority. If so, the Department should develop a process for receiving funds for the recycling value of the spent shell casings generated at the firing range.

USCP Response: The Department generally agrees with this recommendation and will review the recommendation with the General Counsel's Office.

Recommendation 10: We recommend the United States Capitol Police develop a process for destruction of confiscated and/or damaged ammunition.

USCP Response: The Department agrees with this recommendation. PAMD will develop a process which includes controls similar to those used for the destruction of other security sensitive resources, such as weapons, and will plan to have this process ready for implementation and the process test at the conclusion of the Department's complete inventory of ammunition when obsolete or expired ammunition is destroyed.

DEPARTMENT COMMENTS

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the OIG's draft report. Your continued support of the men and women of the United States Capitol Police is appreciated and we will be available to meet and discuss our responses above.

Very respectfully,



Kim C. Dine
Chief of Police

cc: Richard L. Braddock, Chief Administrative Officer
Daniel B. Malloy, Assistant Chief of Police
[REDACTED] USCP Audit Liaison

Appendix C

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Appendix C – [REDACTED] and TSB-Armory Ammunition Inventory as of November 13, 2013				
[REDACTED] Control Record		TSB/PSD Armory Cuff Records Tracking Spread Sheets		Difference
Description	Balance	Description	Balance	
[REDACTED]	66	Not listed	0	66
	1,030,020	[REDACTED]	1,150,000	-119,980
	127,000	Not listed	0	127,000
	314,000	Not listed	0	314,000
	193,000	[REDACTED]	54,000	139,000
	10,000	Not listed	0	10,000
	11,000	Not listed	0	11,000
	100,900	Not listed	0	100,900
	92,059	Not listed	0	92,059
	6,656	Not listed	0	6,656
	3,000	Not listed	0	3,000
	16,650	Not listed	0	16,650

Appendix C – [REDACTED] and TSB-Armory Ammunition Inventory as of November 13, 2013				
[REDACTED] Control Record		TSB/PSD Armory Cuff Records Tracking Spread Sheets		Difference
Description	Balance	Description	Balance	
[REDACTED]	152,050	Not listed	0	152,050
	6,280	Not listed	0	6,280
	87,740	[REDACTED]	395,240	-307,500
	36,100	[REDACTED]	2,000	34,100
	31,972	[REDACTED]	50,460	-18,488
	400	Not listed	0	400
	131,200	Not listed	0	131,200
	23,500	Not listed	0	23,500
	11,000	[REDACTED]	94,500	-83,500
	9,500	[REDACTED]	42,500	-33,000
	150	Not listed	0	150
	150	Not listed	0	150
	150	Not listed	0	150
	7,600	Not listed	0	7,600

Appendix C – [REDACTED] and TSB-Armory Ammunition Inventory as of November 13, 2013				
[REDACTED] Control Record		TSB/PSD Armory Cuff Records Tracking Spread Sheets		Difference
Description	Balance	Description	Balance	
Not listed	0	[REDACTED]	3,200	-3,200
Not listed	0	[REDACTED]	6,250	-6,250

Source: PAMD provided [REDACTED] data and TSB provided ammunition inventory data as of November 13, 2013.

The seal of the Office of Inspector General, United States Capitol Police, is a large, circular emblem in the background. It features a blue outer ring with the words "OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL" in white. Inside the ring is a white circle containing a blue shield with a white dome (the U.S. Capitol) and the words "UNITED STATES" and "CAPITOL POLICE".

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