



UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL



Top Management Challenges Facing the
United States Capitol Police
Fiscal Year 2025

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Introduction

The *Reports Consolidation Act of 2000* requires the Inspector General to identify and report annually the top management and performance challenges facing the agency and assess the agency's progress in addressing those challenges. Each year, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) prepares a summary of the most significant management challenges facing the United States Capitol Police (USCP or the Department). The challenges reflect continuing vulnerabilities OIG identified over the last several years as well as new and emerging issues the Department will face in the coming year.

For Fiscal Year (FY) 2025, OIG identified five management challenges the Department faces. Those challenges are:

1. Protecting and Securing the Capitol Complex
2. Addressing Increasing Threats to Members and their Families
3. Strong, Integrated Internal Control Systems Still Needed
4. Improving Efficiency and Effectiveness of Department Training
5. Recruitment and Retention of a Qualified Work Force

Overall, progress has been possible through the concerted actions of the Chief of Police (Chief), the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO), and leadership and staff within the Department. OIG will continue to monitor USCP's progress towards addressing these challenges.

Top Management Challenges for Fiscal Year 2025

Protecting and Securing the Capitol Complex (Challenge 1)



Source: Senate
Photo Gallery.

Capitol Complex has never been more critical to the safeguarding of our democratic processes.

Protecting and securing the Capitol Complex from various threats, such as terrorists (foreign and domestic), weapons of mass destruction, and violence in any form while at the same time protecting Congress and its staff and welcoming the public continues to be a major challenge. The events of January 6, 2021, and its aftermath, has forever changed the Department. Against this backdrop protection and security of the

The events of January 6, 2021, forced the Department to assess and evaluate its policies, procedures, operations, and philosophy. OIG issued seven reports as part of its review of the events surrounding the takeover of the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. The reports included 103 recommendations.

During FY 2024, USCP successfully closed all the remaining January 6th flash report recommendations representing a significant milestone for USCP. While commendable, the Department must continue to evolve and find the appropriate balance between traditional policing and protection of the Members, their staff, the public, and the Capitol Complex. Continued oversight and attention are also warranted given the issue's direct relevance to homeland security as well as the constant evolution of threats and changing technology. The Department must respond and deploy resources at a level of protection/security sufficient for scheduled or unanticipated events. Examples of such events are mass demonstrations, concerts, suspicious packages, land-based and airborne vehicles as well as changing and emerging threats within an open complex.

USCP faces many large events during FY 2025, including the certification of the election results and the Presidential Inauguration. During this critical period, it will be vital that USCP remains vigilant for emerging threats to the Capitol Complex.

Addressing Increasing Threats to Members of Congress and their Families (Challenge 2)



Source: Senate Photo Gallery.

Representative Lee Zeldin and the husband of then Speaker Nancy Pelosi, and the May 2023 attack on Representative Connolly's district office, violence has become an increasing concern for the Department.

Threats against Members of Congress, although always a concern for USCP, have historically not led to violent acts. But things have changed. From the killing of 6 people and the wounding of 13 others including Representative Gabby Giffords in 2011, to the gunman opening fire in 2017 at the congressional softball game practice wounding then-Majority Whip of the House Stephen Scalise, to the events of January 6, 2021, to the 2022 attacks on

On May 22, 2024, USCP Chief of Police J. Thomas Manger testified before the United States Senate Committee on Appropriations and stated, "Our country is in the midst of an historical rise in threats that is fanned by the current climate of heated political rhetoric; it is both unprecedented and alarming. Over the past year, we have seen a dangerous rise in acts of violence against Members of Congress, their families, and staff. This changing landscape requires that the Department take a proactive approach to threats investigation and Member protection by enhancing its intelligence gathering and sharing capabilities."

To address rising threats against members of Congress, USCP recently established the Protective Intelligence Operations Center (PIOC). The PIOC is a 24-hour operation that includes intake and triage of threats, intelligence, event security, and law enforcement coordination. The PIOC also monitors Members' flights, tracks protective details, monitors residential security systems, and analyses intelligence. During FY 2025, OIG plans to conduct and evaluation of USCP's threat backlog and the PIOC's effectiveness in reducing the backlog.

The Department has also previously taken other steps to enhance security for Members. The Department regularly conducts security awareness training for Members and their staff. USCP conducts security surveys of the Washington, D.C., offices and residences as well as state and district offices and residences. Threat/risk assessments have been performed for the physical security of the Members of Congress and addressing protection-related needs directly with USCP resources or in conjunction with Federal, state, and local law enforcement partners.

OIG will continue to monitor the Department's efforts for addressing this management challenge.

Strong, Integrated Internal Control Systems Still Needed (Challenge 3)

USCP has historically tended to resolve individual issues rather than strengthening the underlying systemically weak controls causing the issues. Managers are responsible for controlling the programs they oversee through internal control systems that bring about desired objectives, such as administering programs correctly and making payments accurately. Those internal controls consist of the policies, procedures, and organizational structures that collectively determine how a program is implemented and how requirements are met. In essence, internal controls are the tools managers use for ensuring that programs achieve intended results efficiently and effectively. They provide for program integrity and proper stewardship of resources. Because systemic control flaws can yield systemic program weaknesses—for example, unrealized objectives and improper payments—managers must continually assess and improve their internal control systems. Once a widespread deficiency is identified, managers must fix the problem before it undermines the program.

USCP's FY 2021 Financial Statement audit report was the first financial statement audit report in which USCP had no significant deficiencies or material weaknesses. The FY 2022 audit also yielded no significant deficiencies or material weaknesses; however, although the FY 2023 audit resulted in an unmodified opinion, the audit identified three significant deficiencies.

OIG is currently engaged in several projects in which we are testing the effectiveness of internal controls, such as a performance audit of USCP contracts, a performance audit of the Office of Logistical Services, and an inspection of the firearms and use-of-force simulator training system. We expect to issue these reports during FY 2025.

USCP has recently made improvements to their internal control system. For example, USCP continues to expand their Office of Inspections and Policy which now includes an Inspections Division, an Internal Controls Division, and a Policy Division. The Internal Controls Division is responsible for verifying the Department's compliance with policies, procedures, rules, regulations, and applicable Federal laws. The Division identifies and manages associated risks to achieve the Department's mission, goals, and objectives, and promotes the safety and security of assets and people within the Department.

Improving the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Department Training (Challenge 4)



Source: Senate Photo Gallery.

The *USCP Department Strategic Plan 2021-2025*, or DSP, details the forward-focused goals and objectives USCP will undertake over those 5 years to meet mission demands. According to the DSP, Objective 1.4, *Train and Develop Sworn and Civilian Personnel to Ensure a Ready, Able, and Professional USCP Workforce*, “enables the administration of robust training and employee development activities for the entire workforce to close competency

gaps, ensure leadership excellence, prepare employees for professional growth, and meet mission demands now and into the future. Key to Objective 1.4 is ensuring the Department invests appropriately in identifying, delivering, and managing the training that will position the USCP to meet future strategic mission requirements, including building a strong cadre of Department leaders.” However, OIG has identified areas of improvement for Department training in several of its reports.

In Report Number 2022-I-0003, *Review of the United States Capitol Police Training Services Bureau*, dated April 2022, OIG reviewed the Department’s Training Services Bureau (TSB). The Bureau is responsible for planning, developing, and implementing Department-wide training programs. OIG found the Department’s decentralized training structure was the reason for many training deficiencies that hinder objectives stated in the DSP. The Department’s decentralized training structure created a lack of TSB oversight for in-service training and a lack of TSB involvement in training research and development. The Department also did not have a sufficient number of training instructors or adequate training space for effectively and efficiently completing entry-level and in-service classes at its training facility at Cheltenham, Maryland.

In Report Number 2022-I-0003, OIG also found USCP did not always adhere to training-related guidance and that its training policies and procedures were not consistent with the best practices of other Federal law enforcement agencies. USCP’s accreditation process did not comply with those of its partner agencies, and the Department did not adhere to guidance related to training records. Furthermore, we found TSB should have increased oversight of cybersecurity and online training for compliance with guidance.


As part of its review of the events surrounding the takeover of the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, OIG also identified areas of improvement for Department training in each of the following reports issued:

- Report Number 2021-I-0003-A, *Review of the Events Surrounding the January 6, 2021, Takeover of the U.S. Capitol, Flash Report: Operational Planning and Intelligence*, dated February 2021
- Report Number 2021-I-0003-B, *Review of the Events Surrounding the January 6, 2021, Takeover of the U.S. Capitol, Flash Report: Civil Disturbance Unit and Intelligence*, dated March 2021
- Report Number 2021-I-0003-C, *Review of the Events Surrounding the January 6, 2021, Takeover of the U.S. Capitol, Flash Report: Counter-Surveillance and Threat Assessment*, dated April 2021
- Report Number OIG-2021-07, *Management Advisory Report: Containment Emergency Response Team Contractor*, dated May 2021
- Report Number 2021-I-0003-D, *Review of the Events Surrounding the January 6, 2021, Takeover of the U.S. Capitol, Flash Report: Containment Emergency Response Team and First Responders Unit*, dated June 2021
- Report Number 2021-I-0003-E, *Review of the Events Surrounding the January 6, 2021, Takeover of the U.S. Capitol, Flash Report: Command and Coordination Bureau*, dated July 2021
- Report Number 2021-I-0003-F, *Review of the Events Surrounding the January 6, 2021, Takeover of the U.S. Capitol, Flash Report: Hazardous Incident Response Division and Canine (K-9) Unit*, dated August 2021
- Report Number 2021-I-0003-G, *Review of the Events Surrounding the January 6, 2021, Takeover of the U.S. Capitol, Flash Report: Dignitary Protection Division and Human Capital*, dated October 2021

In each of those reports, OIG made recommendations designed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of Department training. Recommendations included areas such as increasing TSB oversight for all training-related activity, formalizing a training research and development process, increasing training staff and space, implementing additional training guidance, and increasing joint training between USCP elements as well as between USCP and its partner agencies. As of November 15, 2024, USCP has closed all of the January 6th flash report recommendations and has closed [REDACTED] recommendations noted in report 2022-I-0003.

OIG is monitoring the Department's efforts for addressing this management challenge. During FY 2025, OIG plans to conduct an inquiry into the adequacy of the Cheltenham, MD, training facility.

Recruitment and Retention of a Qualified Work Force (Challenge 5)



Source: Senate Photo Gallery.

levels, face the same challenges of recruiting and retaining qualified personnel. Recruitment efforts from all levels of the profession are targeting a decreasing pool of eligible candidates. With evolving attitudes about employment and the public perception about law enforcement, recruitment and retention has become more difficult. Additionally, the officers hired during the post-9/11 surge have now reached the minimum retirement age.

See the table below for statistics on separated employees and new hires during FYs 2020 through 2024. While USCP has experienced increased attrition in recent years, hiring has significantly increased in FYs 2022 through 2024. However, USCP staffing levels continue to remain below authorized levels.

Fiscal Year	Separated Employees	New Hires	Net Change
2020	119	92	-27
2021	171	137	-34
2022	213	328	115
2023	190	282	92
2024	189	390	201

During Calendar Year (CY) 2021, USCP offered employees a \$3,000 retention bonus, and in CYs 2022 and 2024 USCP offered employees an \$8,000 retention bonus. The retention bonuses for CYs 2023 and 2024 included service periods that end on December 31, 2024, and December 31, 2025, respectively. The retention bonuses have undoubtedly helped reduce attrition among Department employees, and without future retention bonuses USCP could face increased attrition in the years ahead as other Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies continue to offer signing bonuses and other benefits to entice lateral transfers.

With the dramatic increase in the number of threats against Members of Congress over the last several years, the need for manpower has never been greater. On July 26, 2023, USCP Chief of Police J. Thomas Manger testified before a joint hearing of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration and the Committee on House Administration and stated, “One of the Department’s greatest challenges is the retention of our Dignitary Protection Division (DPD) and Investigations Division Agents.”

The Department clearly recognizes the need to focus on recruitment, retention, and development of its workforce to effectively and efficiently accomplish its mission. OIG will continue to monitor the Department’s progress toward meeting this management challenge.

