




UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510
June 16, 2025

INSPECTOR GENERAL

MEMORANDUM

TO: Sean P. Gallagher
Acting Chief of Police

FROM: David T. Harper
Inspector General 

SUBJECT: *Management Advisory Report: Telework Agreement, Screening Procedures, and Home-to-Work Vehicle Compliance (Report Number OIG-2025-09)*

During a recent inquiry, three issues came to the attention of the Office of Inspector General (OIG) which we believe warrant the attention of the United States Capitol Police (USCP or the Department) leadership. The Department was not complying with Directive [REDACTED], dated November 18, 2022, related to telework of senior officials. Additionally, the Department was not complying with their procedures regarding screening of individuals on the Capitol Complex. Finally, a senior official was not complying with Directive [REDACTED] dated April 25, 2016, regarding nonofficial passengers in a USCP vehicle.

Directive [REDACTED] states, "To be considered for the USCP Telework Program, employees must complete a [REDACTED]." During our inquiry, OIG requested the [REDACTED] of a senior official who had engaged in telework. The Department stated that neither this senior official nor anyone else at that rank had [REDACTED] on file with the Department. Directive [REDACTED] defines a [REDACTED] as, "A formal agreement completed by an employee and a supervisor specifying the terms and conditions of the telework agreement." Without clearly defined terms and conditions of telework for all teleworking employees, USCP risks employees teleworking without clear expectations. This also creates the appearance that there are different rules for senior leadership than for rank-and-file employees.

SOP [REDACTED] dated August 16, 2024, states, that only [REDACTED] are exempt from security screening when entering the building. It further states that sworn officers working at the building entrance should, "Conduct a security screening on all individuals desiring to enter the ECG (except the aforementioned exceptions)." During our inquiry, OIG became aware of individuals who were not one of these exceptions but were allowed to enter the building without being screened. OIG did not pursue this noncompliance because the SOP contains conflicting information when it later states, "As a general rule,

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visitors should always be screened. However, if any Authorized Personnel allows their guest to circumvent the screening process, document the time, date, and the name of the Authorized Person on the [REDACTED].” The SOP gives no further detail on the types of guests that Authorized Personnel are allowed to bring into the building without going through the screening process. Without clearly defined policy, entrance screeners may lack the information they need to determine who should go through the security screening process. Additionally, a Department official stated that [REDACTED] were not being utilized at the entrance to the USCP Eney, Chestnut, and Gibson Memorial Building despite being required by the SOP. Finally, Directive [REDACTED], dated October 16, 2018, outlines the security screening process at interior access points on the Capitol Complex. The directive outlines ten types of individuals who are exempt from security screening. During our inquiry, OIG became aware of USCP senior officials whose guests did not meet the definition of any of the exemptions noted in the directive, who did not receive a security screening when entering the Capitol Complex on January 20, 2025.

Directive [REDACTED], dated April 25, 2016, states, “The sole reason for operation of a USCP fleet vehicle is the accomplishment of official business. The transportation of non-official passengers in vehicles on official business shall be avoided. An exception may be granted in writing only by the COP [Chief of Police] to permit the incidental transportation of non-official passengers.” The directive goes on to require that the COP approval be documented on a [REDACTED]. During our inquiry, we observed video footage which showed a senior USCP official transport two guests to an event at the United States Capitol Building in a vehicle that matched the description of the senior official’s USCP vehicle. The Chief of Police authorized this senior official to, “transport spouse and/or children” as guests at official events on a [REDACTED]. During an interview of the senior official, the official stated that the guests who accompanied them to the event mentioned above were their cousin and their cousin’s friend. However, the Department did not provide any [REDACTED] forms in which the Chief of Police authorized the senior official to transport these passengers in a USCP vehicle.

Recommendation 1: We recommend that the United States Capitol Police comply with Directive [REDACTED], dated November 18, 2022, regarding [REDACTED] telework agreements for senior leadership.

Recommendation 2: We recommend that the United States Capitol Police (USCP) update SOP [REDACTED], dated August 16, 2024, to remove conflicting information, and clearly define who is exempt from the security screening process. Additionally, USCP should ensure that officers at the entrance to the Eney, Chestnut, and Gibson Building are completing form [REDACTED] in accordance with SOP [REDACTED].

Acting Chief of Police – Sean P. Gallagher
June 16, 2025

Recommendation 3: We recommend that the United States Capitol Police comply with the screening procedures outlined in Directive [REDACTED] [REDACTED] dated October 16, 2018, when senior officials escort guests into the Capitol Complex.

Recommendation 4: We recommend that the United States Capitol Police comply with Directive [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] dated April 15, 2016, regarding nonofficial passengers in the USCP vehicles of senior officials.

We conducted this work with integrity, objectivity, and independence as required by the *Quality Standards for Federal Offices of Inspector General* issued by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE). Those standards set forth the overall quality framework for managing, operating, and conducting the work of Offices of Inspector General. The work adhered to the professional standards of objectivity, independence, due professional care, and quality assurance and followed procedures to ensure accuracy of the information presented.

cc: Mr. Timothy Blodgett, Chief of Staff
Acting Assistant Chief Jeanita Mitchell, Protective and Intelligence Operations
Assistant Chief Ashan M. Benedict, Standards and Training Operations
Mr. Thomas A. DiBiase, General Counsel
Ms. Magdalena Boynton, Chief Administrative Officer
[REDACTED] Audit Liaison